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LAW AND MORALS 
ROBERT SOLER 
AT first sight it would seem that law and morals have structurally 
got so little in common that a complete separation of the two is 
desirable. On the one hand, morality depends for its very exis-
tence on the free choice of the individual: on the other hand, law 
involves the imposition ab extra of the norm of a society, even 
where this goes against the wishes of an individ.ual. Morality is 
essentially concerned with the subject's free personal ~hoice: 
whereas law is something external to the subject's wishes, so 
much so that it requires enforcement. 
It would seem therefore to be a contradiction in terms to 'enforce 
morality': for morality, precisely, depends on the free choice of an 
individual. If society imposes a given type of mora I activity on an 
individual, that activity will not be moral unless the individual 
freely and personally makes that action his own through a personal 
choice. Society can in no case make a person's action moral: the 
free decision of the individual makes an action moral. Therefore it 
would seem that society should refrain from attempting to pre-
scribe certain types of moral action. 
In favour of a complete separation of law and morals, it is also 
argued that the unimpeded exercise of free choice is a value in it-
self, and that any encroachment on a person's freedom of choice is 
questionable anyway. 
DEFINITION OF THE TERM 'MORALS' 
Before we proceed further, I think it is worth noting that in com-
mon linguistic usage there is a distinction that comes out in the 
following two statements: 
A bank-manager who discloses his client's secrets acts unethi-
cally. 
A bank-manager who sleeps with his client's wife acts immoral-
ly. 
(Analogously in Maltese we would say of 'the first type of activity 
'mhux sew', and would label the second 'immorali ' ). 
It is not here 9ur purpose to evaluate this linguistic usage. As 
a first step it is sufficient to be conscious of this distinction that 
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is often made. Along the lin_es of this distinction, 'morality' is 
identified with sexual ethics, whereas tethics, is taken in a more 
general sense. The result is that when people talk of law and mo-
rals, they all too often are uncritically at the back of their minds 
thinking about sexual ethics, not about ethics in a more general 
sense. 
In this article, I sha Ll not be using the term t morals' in the res-
tricted sense of 'sexual morality•: when I talk of tmorals' I mean 
ethics in the most general sense, i.e. all those acts in which man 
freely exercises his responsibility through moral choice. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF LAW TO MORALS 
Both as a matter of fact and as a matter of principle, law and 
morals are very closely linked: 
(i) At the observational level, it is good to recall that moral is-
sues of all sorts come into the legal system a~ all levels. Whether 
we talk of guarantees of a free trial for all, or of equality before 
the law, or of statutes against racial discrimination or murder, or 
of laws providing for graded taxation, or of laws allowing those 
who object in conscience to military-service to ren.der some other 
type of social service to society, we are concerned with issues 
where the demands of the moral law coincide with norms of the le-
gal system, where law and morality positively meet. As a matter 
of sheer fact, it is impossible to describe a legal system correctly 
if one prescinds completely from ethical issues. Morals de /acto 
come into all areas of law, and not just the criminal law. And the 
moral issues that pervade the legal system are not just, not even 
principally, issues of sexual morality. 
(ii) Further, morals come into a system of law as a matter of ne-
cessity and in their own right. Law can for some purposes be 
thought of merely as a system of norms: but it can only be ade-
qu.ately explained in terms of its end, which is to serve man, the 
moral subject par excellence. Law is there not for its own sake but 
co create for man decent conditions of co-existence. These con di· 
tions are constantly judged by man himself to be t just' or 'unjust'. 
When man therefore secs up a legal system, he sets it up on the 
basis of his moral ideal of hims e If and of his society: and he 
judges the success· both of the legal system and of any one parti· 
cular law in terms of such an ideal. Man thereby constantly refers 
law, through his judgement, co law• s end (that of serving man). 
Law therefore is necessarily and remains necessarily embedded in 
man's moral being; it is no more and no less than a help to man's 
moral existence~ Any attempt to exclude morality from the legal 
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system fails to grasp that law and morals are re lated as means to 
end. 
The real question is not, therefore, whether morals should come 
into law at all, but how, to what e.x:tent, on what concrete issues. 
LAW IS CONCERNED WITH ELIMINATING WRONG ANO CREATING IBE POS· 
)IBILITY OF ASSOCIATING WITH OIBER MEN 
There is of course, at this stage, an important modification that 
must be made. Nobody can envisage or defend legislation of all 
possible ethical standards. Law is not there to substitute morality. 
To this extent I would agree with Hart and others that where pos-
sible one should allow the moral decision to be taken freely and 
without the coercion of the law. 
But then there are situations where we have clear evidence that 
men regularly act and are acting unjustly towards each other, that 
they thoughtlessly and repeatedly hurt one another. What do we 
then, as men, do io such a situation? Apart from exploiting the 
possibilities inherent in education, can we just stand there and do 
1othing? 
According to Professor Cotta of the University of Rome, at this 
stage the law must intervene to 'eliminate wrong'. This is the most 
:>riginal, the most basic, characteristic of law, law's L'rpbiinomen. 1 
What does Cotta mean by the term 'eliminate wrong'? He means 
the following: men spontaneously form friendships and express 
their love towards the people they like. Their ability to love all 
spontaneously and generously is, however, limited. Now if X and 
Y cannot be friends, must they be enemies? Is there no remedy, no 
middle way? There is: for law gives man the possibility of asso· 
ciating with others. If X cannot be on friendly terms with Y, at 
least he can be Y's associate. They can expect of each other re-
gularity, loyalty and foreseeable conduct - and all this can find 
expression in a bilateral contract. What they demand of each other 
is a minimum of truth and reasonable conduct, some minimum im· 
posed by the society they live in. 
What, therefore, says Cotta, distinguishes law from, say, poli-
tics or ethics, is the determination positively to work out the mi-
nimum standard of ethics which is essential to guarantee that men 
who are not friends can at least be associates. Law does not come 
up to the exalted standards of ethics, but it draws ·on ethics in 
asking all men to be associates to all men; characteristic of law 
1 'Filosofia della politic a e filosofia del diritto' in 'Primo Simposio di Fi· 
losofia della Politiccr Tradizione e Novita della Filosofia della Politica• 
Ed. Laterza 1970,- pages 69-79. 
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is that it refuses to tolerate infringement of the regulations de-
signed to create sociability. Law therefore is universal, in that my 
associate is any person, irrespective of colour, race or nationali-
ty. Cotta adds that the more a person is a stranger, the more (pa-
radoxically) I am interested in making him an associate, through 
legal rules, with a view to at least avoiding his enmity. The aim 
of law is not therefore and cannot be as sublime as chat of morals: 
nor can law force me to perform a moral ace, for I must choose the 
moral act for it co become moral. But law can lead me on to see 
that a certain type of action is moral and therefore can pre-dis pose 
me for the right moral choice • 
. The aim of law is, on Cotta's view, universal like that of ethics: 
the logic of law is centrifugal, it constantly breaks the small walls 
of friendship co create the larger bastions of association - asso-
ciation cannot be seen as a substitute to rnora lity but it is certain-
ly not totally divorced from morality! International law is the best 
evidence of the centrifugal logic of law: it shows chat even the 
boundaries of the state are insufficient. Men are forced constantly 
to widen their horizon, to open themselves to others at lease so as 
to make life liveable and to prevent possible wrongs to chemse Ives 
and co others. 
THE QUESTION OF CONCRETE ISSUES 
Having said, then, that law participates in ethics and has its 
particular moral objective in life, and yet that it does not aim ac 
instituting a reign of ethics, the question arises: when it comes co 
concrete issues, which criteria shall we adopt to decide which mo· 
ral issues should be legislated upon and which not? Clearly it is 
not enough to say that law aims at the avoidance of wron~ and at 
creating the presuppositions of universal association between men. 
We must look further and formulate more precise questions so as to 
throw light on the concrete issue that we !llighc have in mind to le· 
gislate upon. 
I am afraid chat at this stage I can only state the se If-evident 
and say that this is the most difficult point when talking of law and 
morals, the point where the decision muse be taken whether a con-
crete issue shou.ld be made a matter of law or not. 
Nevertheless ic is imperative to suggest a few, at least centa· 
tive gu~de-lines that_ may further our reflection. In deciding whe-
ther to {egislate on a particular issue or not, I would envisage the 
following type of question: 
- is this concrete law being proposed enforceable and will it en-
joy the respect of at least a large section of society? 
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- w i 11 this law foster in men respect and love of one another or 
will it tend to turn men in egoistically on themselves? (a question 
of this sort might be relevant to issues of taxation, to questions of 
race-discrimination, etc.) 
- does this law completely crush individual privacy, the right to 
think and have private notes, etc.? (a question of this sort might be 
relevant to the issue of extending police powers to search a per-
son's home) 
- would this law impose liability for actions for which the de-
fendant is not, or is largely not, responsible? (a question relevant 
to criminal statutes in preparation) 
- does this law, which deprives X of some of his liberty, protect 
a more important right of Y? (a question of this sort is relevant 
wherever there is a conflict of subjective rights) 
In the series of tentative questions I have listed, only the first 
question is a general one and could have relevance for the whole 
area of law. The other questions are more limited in scope. They 
refer to concrete issues and are posited in a particular area of law. 
Within each area of law, such particular and more precise questions 
can better clarify the issue as to whether to legislate or not. Clear-
ly even if, in instituting laws regarding taxation and in drawing up 
a criminal statute, I might in both cases want to eliminate wrong, 
I have to ask further concrete questions on each of the two sta-
tutes to decide whether to legislate or not. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion I would like briefly to re-state the view of law and 
morals expanded upon above. 
As a matter of definition, I defined the term 'morals' in a wide 
sense and took it to be co-extensive with the term 'ethics'. Con-
trary to common linguistic usage, the term 'morals' in this article 
was not restricted to the sphere of sexual morality. 
Having so defined the term 1morals', I then touched upon the fol-
lowing four points: 
(i) As a matter of pure observation, moral issues ·come into all 
areas of law and not just into the criminal l~w. They pervade the 
legal system. 
(ii) As a matter of principle and in terms of what the legal sys~ 
tern is out to achieve, morals cannot be excluded from the law, for 
law itself is only adequately defined in terms of its end, which is 
to serve man, who is the moral subject par e.x:ce llence. Evidence 
of our constantly referring law to its ethical ideal is talk about jus-
tice, which demonstrates our ability to compare what the law 
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achieves in fact with our ideal of the law as an instrument in the 
service of man. 
(iii) Law however does not aim at instituting a reign of morality 
in society: it is interested in at least eliminating all forms of 
wrong that necessarily jar with the ideal of justice, and in insti-
tuting a minimum standard of morality that allows all men to be if 
not friends, then at lease associates. 
(iv) Where concrete issues upon which to legislate are concern-. 
ed, different questions are relevant and different considerations 
will decide whether it is right to legislate on a given issue. 
Clearly, from a strictly ethical point of view, law cannot make 
people moral: all along, the morality of an act depends on its being 
enforced ab extra. And yet law, of its very natur.e and because of 
its particular finality, is necessarily concerned with morals. A 
complete dichotomy of law and morals is unthinkable. 
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